Global Journal of Human Social Science, D: History, Archaeology and Anthroplogy, Volume 23 Issue 3

© 2023 Global Journals Volume XXIII Issue III Version I 27 ( ) Global Journal of Human Social Science - Year 2023 D “The Pen is Mightier than the Sword”: Popular Ethics in Edo Period Japan While large-scale political revolution was averted, a cultural “revolution” unfolded beginning with the 1600’s, in which not just the upper classes but now also commoners could participate in, and create, cultural activities, such as theatre going, painting, and gardening. Matsunosuke notes that “the strength of Edo-period culture is not to be found in extant artifacts of the era. Rather, its strength lies chiefly in its spectacular breadth and diversity. This was a period of unprecedented cultural prosperity.” 13 III. R oots: 17 th C entury P olitics and N eo- C onfucianism Cultural development of this magnitude belies an underlying stability throughout a country in which the political, social, and economic segments of society have not only found their own strength and stability but have also found a mutual interdependence that unites the peoples and thus creates an environment in which law and order create safety and predictability that fosters cultural and economic growth. Neo-Confucian learning appears to have provided the philosophical roots from which these variegated societal fruits grew. It is important to understand not just its application within Tokugawan society but especially its ideological basis. It is this ideological basis that would come under attack from a variety of directions as the learning of the ancients became more accepted by scholars outside of the Neo-Confucian “universe,” many of whom were located in Kyoto. Even before the Edo period, warlords and high ranking samurai were attracted to Sung Neo- Confucianism, especially to the teachings of Zhu Xi. 14 “Daigongen” (great incarnation of the Buddha essence). Cf. further, Willem Boot, “Ieyasu and the Founding of the Tokugawa Shogunate” in Sources of Japanese Tradition: 1600 –2000 , Vol. 2 (2 nd ed.; Wm. Theodore de Bary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur E. Tiedemann, eds.; New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 7–32, esp. 11. 13 Nishiyama Matsunosuke, Edo Culture: Daily Life and Diversions in Urban Japan, 1600–1868 (Gerald Groemer, trans.; Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), 8, 9. Matsunosuke summarizes some of the cultural exploits of the populace: “Even the general public took part in leisure pursuits and played an active role in the creation of new cultural forms. The average commoner read books or visited the theater; some even wrote haiku verse and senryu (seventeen-syllable comic verse) or performed musical genres such as gidayu, kato bushi, shinnai, or nagauta. Others went on pilgrimages sponsored by religious associations ( ko ) and toured distant places…clothing and housing too showed marked improvement...never before had there been such an extraordinary variety of hand-made cultural artifacts in Japan…people in every corner of the land were busy manufacturing local specialities…by the late Edo period this activity had stimulated an unprecedented development of the transportation network…indeed, the construction of footpaths during the late Edo period can be seen as a kind of symbol of this golden age of handicraft culture” (Ibid., 9). 14 Tokugawa rulers who appear to have taken Neo-Confucian scholars into their service include Ieyasu (1542–1616; shogun 1603–1605), Iemitsu (shogun 1623–1651) financed a school for Hayashi Razan (1583–1657) to spread his teachings. The fact that there existed an official ideology is seen in the punishment of Kumazawa Banzan Scholarshi p t raditionally acknowledges that Zhu Xi’s teachings were transformed into important religious, political and ethical forces during the Tokugawa shogunate. 15 Ooms agrees to a point, but he problematizes the scholarly conception th at “Neo- Confucianism monopolized this discourse, and…[that] its relationship to the Tokugawa power structure transformed it into an of ficial orthodoxy.” 16 He cites as evidence the fact that “Ieyasu and the next three shoguns…gave no distinctive institutional support to Neo-Con fuc ianism.” 17 Ooms does concede, nonetheless, that “a considerable Neo-Confucian vocabulary was employed to talk and think about man and society.” 18 Ooms counterbalances this Neo- Confucian influence, thou gh, with his observation that Shinto did more than Confucianism for the political ideology of the divine right of the emperor by virtue of the concept of a living kami . 19 a) Chinese vs. Japanese Neo-Confucian Ideology The Japanese appropriation of Zhu Xi’s philosophy, however, was more overtly focused towards socio-political ends than was the case with their Chinese counterparts. Chinese Neo-Confucians focused upon the transformation of individual selfish nature ( qi ) into the pure, or original, human nature ( li ) that was in harmony with the cosmic principle of the highest moral good. Zhu (1619–1691), and Yamaga Sok ō for “unorthodox” views. Tsunayoshi (shogun, 1680–1709) was a frequent lecturer on Neo-Confucianism. 15 Herman Ooms says the “broadly speaking there is no denying that 17 th century Japan is witness to a well-developed political discourse that is absent in the previous century” (“Neo-Confucianism and the Formation of Early Tokugawa Ideology: Contours of a Problem,” in Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture [Peter Nosco, ed.; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984], 27–61, esp. 30). 16 Ooms, “Neo-Confucianism,” 30. Ooms identifies five points that scholarship has “uncritically woven into standard treatments” of the ‘official’ linkage between bakufu, Neo-Confucianism and ideology. These five strands are: (1) a linkage between the bakufu, Neo- Confucianism, and ideology; (2) this linkage is seen as an event that took place between three primary individuals—Ieyasu, Seika, Razan; (3) this event is portrayed as a conscious decision by Ieyasu to unite politics with a national ideology; (4) it is implied that only a single body of thought, Neo-Confucianism, was comprehensively appropriated; and (5) the shift from Buddhism to Neo-Confucianism is presented as a substitution of secular, rational thought for religious doctrine, and structured as a phenomenon of historical discontinuity” (Ibid., 29). All five strands stem from the writings of Hayashi Razan himself, which writings are doubtlessly self-serving. In this regard, Ooms notes that And ō Sh ō eki (1703–1762) “an articulate and critical thinker, exposed all ideologies (Neo-Confucianism in particular) as ploys to rob the peasants, and accused Hayashi Razan of having contributed to this deception” (Ibid., 57). Ooms quotes Sh ō eki’s critique of ideology in his book Tokugawa Ideology:Early Constructs, 1570–1680 (p. 296): “The Way of Sages functioned to make excuses for thieves…including Hayashi Razan…violated the Way of Heaven by robbing the common people.” Ooms suggests further that “Sh ō eki’s views, like those of Razan (or any other writer) are partial views, but the time has come to look at Tokugawa ideology through Sh ō eki’s eyes rather than Razan’s. Sh ō eki’s views are more to the point” (Ibid., 296). 17 Ooms, “Neo-Confucianism,” 33. 18 Ooms, “Neo-Confucianism,” 30. 19 Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology , 73.