Global Journal of Human Social Science, E: Economics, Volume 22 Issue 2

judicial system on the quality of protection of private property rights or the performance of governments, and they share the historical approach to some extent. In truth, the rules controlling the legal system in many countries are frequently the product of historical events. b) Inflation: An Institutional Origin? Daniel (2020) defines inflation as "the loss of money's purchasing power that results in a general and continuous increase in prices." Several economic theoretical investigations have attempted to explain the origins of inflation in a given country. While there is a substantial body of economic literature on the causes of the general price increase, institutional factors have always been mentioned. They have become increasingly prominent in recent years. Consequently, the forefathers of inflation analysis, such as Hume (1752), Ricardo (1817), and others, approach the problem via a monetarist lens. According to these scholars, the main reason for market price spikes is the amount of money in circulation in an economy. To this effect, Hume (1752) asserts that if an economy's money supply is doubled, the price of thingswill be twice as well. Based on the theoretical observation of the monetary origin of inflation, Keynesians willargue that the government should pursue a monetary interventionist strategy to regulate and control the market's price evolution. However, only more recent research has revealed that the issue is not so much the quantity of money in circulation as it is the trustworthiness of the money handled by institutions. Institutional flaws, according to Huang et Wei (2006), Hefeker (2010) and Dimakou (2013), impair agents' confidence in the currency of the country in question and, consequently, the currency's credibility. Even if inflation has a monetary origin, the institutionalimprint cannot be ignored; it is the primary source of the phenomena. While theoretical theories are focused on explaining a presumed channel between institutions and inflation, there are nevertheless paradigms that highlight the existence of a bidirectional relationship, demonstrating that inflation affects the quality of institutions. According to Braun et Di-Tella (2004), an increase in the general price level leads to a rise in the market's price control expenses. Thus, governmental agents in charge of price control will be harassed or will harass enterprises to collect remuneration for turning a blind eye to specific frauds related to the non- observance of price ceilings in the context of Keynesian economic functioning. Thanks to the rise in corruption, institutions are deteriorating. This phenomena has several ramifications. As the level of corruption increases, the cost of investment rises, discouraging new entrants and reducing overall investment, which limits the number of enterprises in the market, stifling growth. According to Huang et Wei (2006), a country's exchange rate system has impacts on inflation. The policy choice to adopt a fixed exchange rate system and, thus, a monetary peg has ramifications. In e ff ect, the inking country has better institutions than countries that ink their currency on foreign currencies, causing the latter to look to the inking country as a model. This leads to a tendency to peg to the inking country's inflation rate: this is inflation targeting, whichentails setting an inflation rate based on the inflation rate of a model country. Revenues from currency issues and foreign exchange gains are non-existent because the exchange rate is fixed. Accordingly, countries that ink their currency have no choice but to increase the general level of taxation, either through rate increases or by broadening the tax base, increasing the cost of production and, therefore, an increase in the selling price and, ultimately, a reduction in social welfare. III. E mpirical R eview of the L iterature a) Some empirical work on the effect of institutions on economic growth The empirical work that has assigned itself the purpose of evaluating the effect of institutions on economic growth adds to the theoretical arguments regarding the impact of institutions on economic growth. Inequalities in law are presented as the reason for differences in economic performance in the empirical approach that focuses on the legal origins of institutions. In this regard, some works have been developed, such as La porta (1998), Djankov et al. (2002), and Glaeser et al. (2004). The created concept states that differences in economic performance can be explained by the weight of law enacted in each country. Accordingly, the empirical analyses center on comparing the various legal systems around the world. Thus, La porta (1998) finds that in countries governed by the "common law," Anglo-Saxon legal system, the protection of investors' rights and the enforcement of contracts are more crutial, moderately essential in countries governed by the German civil code system, and weaker in countries governed by the French civil code. Mahoney (2001) used econometric analysis to determine the impact of institutions on growth, concluding that common law nations grew faster than civil law countries between 1960 and 1992. These authors propose several explanations for this phenomenon. According to them, the ease of contracting, the procedural ease of settling conflicts and forming firms etc... are at the heart of the excellent economic performance seen in nations with Anglo- Saxon institutional inspiration, as opposed to countries that follow the civil code. Along with empirical work that explains differences in economic performance by the legal origin © 2022 Global Journals Volume XXII Issue II Version I 31 ( ) Global Journal of Human Social Science - Year 2022 E Institutional Analysis of the Determinants of Economic Non-Take-Off and High Living Standards in Cameroon between 1990 and 2019