Global Journal of Human Social Science, E: Economics, Volume 22 Issue 2

of institutions, there is an empirical study that points to the colonial imprint as the trustworthy source of institutions in ex-colonized nations in general and developing countries in particular. The core concept of this stream of empirical research is that economic differences are the product of colonial-era institutional differences. The authors of this paper argue that the quality of institutions in place, particularly in developing countries, is influenced by colonial policies. Acémoglu et al. (2001) used empirical investigations to show that the quality of the laws and rules of the economic game is greatly influenced by the settler's goal. So, they concluded that settlements have superior institutions to exploiting colonies. Therefore, the colonists' desired settlement areas witnessed the construction of institutions similar to the city’s. Investing in the establishment of solid institutions, on the other hand, was the last goal in terms of exploitative colonies. Acémoglu, Johnson et Robinson (2001) employed numerous proxies to approximate this reality: the colony's topography, diseases, colonists' life expectancy, and so on. Sachs et Waner (2001) looked at a group of countries from 1950 to 1995 and ran different regressions to determine the importance of geography in income. They began by performing a regression between malaria risk as indicated by its index and per capita income while adjusting for all other variables. The malaria index is inversely connected with growth rates, according to the regression results. After that, they used Rodrik's (2005) equation to refute the premise that location does not affect income in the absence of institutions. Thus, geographical variables such as distance to the sea, Malaria index, and economic variables were considered (trade openness). Beck et al. (2003) found that ex-European developing nations that utilize French civil law as a template for the organization of their judicial systems are less protective of private property rights than their counterparts who use common law, based on a sample of 70 developing countries. They used the Fraser Institute and Heritage Fundation databases to compile a 1997 index of private property rights protection. b) Empirical relationships between institutions and inflation The relationship between institutions and inflation has been studied in some empirical research. These investigations revealed that a decline in institutional quality has a significant impact on price level control. Thus, Al-Marhubi (2000) uses the level of corruption as a proxy for the quality of institutions in his study of 41 countries, which includes both developed and developing countries, and finds a positive relationship between corruption and the general price level, implying that a rise in corruption leads to an increase in inflation. In a related study, Ben et Sassi (2016) claim that a decline in the quality of institutions because of more significant of corruption leads to a fall in cash inflows and, consequently, a fiscal deficit, which will be financed by fiscal pressure, which would result in price increases. The inefficiency in collecting fiscal revenues owing to corruption and embezzlement of public funds is thus the channel via which the decline in the quality of institutions influences inflation (Blackburn et Powell, 2011; Tanzi et Davoodi, 2000). Inflation, which is frequently associated with adverse effects on growth, can also positively affect the economy if certain institutional conditions are met. This conclusion is reinforced by Mehdi (2021), who recommends an increase in inflation-friendly institutional reforms in Morocco in order to profit from the debt- reduction effect of inflation. Furthermore, assuming that the level of debt remains unchanged, an increase in the general price level leads to an increase in supply and hence output, which leads to a rise in the value of Gross Domestic Product and thus tends to reduce the debt/GDP ratio. Morocco, which has an 80% debt-to- GDP ratio, has an interest in promoting inflation to reduce its debt without resorting to fiscal pressure. Furthermore, Goel (2010) and Marackbi (2020) re-echoed the cyclical effect of inflation, institutional quality, and economic growth in their empirical investigations. In this regard, whenthe general price level rises, it becomes more challenging to supervise the behavior of economicagents, resulting in an increase in corruption and, so, a decline in the quality of institutions, raising institutional obstacles to investment (red tape, high costs of starting a business...). IV. M ethodological A pproach a) Theoretical basis of the model The significantity of empirical studies on the effect of institutions on economic growth can be divided into two categories: those that use a sample of multiple nations and those that focus on a single country. Studies affecting groups of countries tend to formalize dynamic models estimated using the MMG approach and panel data (Kaufmann et Kraay, 2002; Idrissa et al., 2018), whereas studies affecting a single country employ time- iseries data and linear models to analyze the problem (Kaufmann et Kraay, 2002). These models are estimated using either the Ordinary Least Square method (OLS) with the implementation of a specific test (Mauro, 1995), or the VAR estimation method (Djoawe et Bouba, 2018), among other methods. Due to the fact that this is an analysis of the case of Cameroon, we rely on the empirical framing of Mauro (1995), Abdoul (2010) and Knack et Keefer (1995) to formulate a linear model of institutional growth, a model that will be estimated using time series data and will be completed with a model stability test that assures Volume XXII Issue II Version I 32 ( ) Global Journal of Human Social Science - Year 2022 © 2022 Global Journals E Institutional Analysis of the Determinants of Economic Non-Take-Off and High Living Standards in Cameroon between 1990 and 2019