Global Journal of Human Social Science, E: Economics, Volume 22 Issue 2

slewof other initiatives, one thing is clear: the problem persists. The phenomenon has grown to the point where it is difficult to know where to begin. It appears to have become the accepted practiceamong citizens. It is now common knowledge that you must motivate a cashier in order to receive your salary or any other payment (especially if the amount is significant), and that a file or letter that is not "followed up" is likely to be lost in the offices... Consequently, the phenomenon causes significant losses for both households (according to Transparency International, families spend an average of 102,500 francs per month on bribes, which is significantly more than the monthly salary of some senior civil servants) and the state (according to Samuel Ekoum, president of the Cameroonian Non- Governmental Organization named SOS Corruption, Cameroon loses an average of 400 billion francs per year due to corruption). Thus, stronger measures are needed to deter such behaviors, which are sometimes the result of bureaucratic red tape and procedural formalism, orchestrating the use of money to abbreviate these procedures. − Strengthen efforts to consolidate public finances It is confusing to attribute Cameroon's low investment budget to the country's financial woes, given the minimal amount allotted to public investments and the outrageous misappropriation of public funds. Given this, it becomes almost impossible not to infer that the significant issue is the quality of governance rather than the budget deficit. Few managers of Cameroon's public service have escaped being imprisoned because of the intractability of a fewbillion francs. Therefore, there is still a lot that can be done to improve the quality of public financial management. Beyond "Operation Sparrow Hawk," which focuses on catching "pickpockets," repressive and even deterrent measures should be implemented as soon aspossible. In reality, rather than incarceration, which is an additional cost to the state, measures aimed at retrieving concealed sums of money must be established. It would also be necessary to establish legislation to deter future attempts at embezzlement. It is essential to create a public management audit system based on a strategy that is more focused on sticks than carrots. Faced with a resurgence of high prices in Cameroon, the source of which, as our empirical study shows, is institutional, there is an urgent need to implement reforms that are firmly geared toward the control and regulation of market prices, rather than actions that are part of "institutional posturing." We recommend the following measures to achieve this goal: − Promote "made in Cameroon good" in order to reduce imports and thereforeimported inflation Cameroon's trade balance is unstable due to a high gap between imports and exports, which has the effect of introducing inflation into the markets from across the border. So, it is critical boosting national manufacturing through funding projects led by qualified young people,as well as the establishment of local raw material transformation enterprises. − Develop inflation control measures, including inflation targeting The Cameroonian government must ensure that prices are stabilized to keep the currency's purchasing power at an adequate level to fulfil better the goal of improving the population's well-being. Then, it would be prudent to establish an inflation target rate that must be adhered to on the markets, as well as to ensure that this rate is applied effectively through market raids by control teams established for this reason. R eferences R éférences R eferencias 1. Abdoul' Ganiou, M. (2010). Institutions and development: analysis of the macroeconomic effects of institutions and institutional reforms in developing countries. Thesis, University of Auvergne-Clermont , 45-50. 2. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. et Robinson, J.A. (2001). 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