Global Journal of Human Social Science, E: Economics, Volume 22 Issue 3

The unequal meritocracy or conditional independence model is located on the first row of Table 1. It is considered the reference model. According to this model, the level of education attained is linked to the status of the parents (Inequality). Positioning in the labor market is only linked to the level of education attained (meritocracy). When introduced into the model of inegalitarian meritocracy as presented in the second line of Table 1, the dependence of an individual's institutional sector on that of his father (OD), undergoes an improvement of 82.5 percent of difference between the actual 2005 data and the reference model. This improvement is 95.5 percent when we refer to 2010 data. The intergenerational link of the status is, so to speak, decisive in explaining the reality of the Cameroonian context. In addition, the resulting model satisfactorily reproduces the data with non-significant probabilities of rejecting the hypothesis of difference between the data of this model and the real data. In other words, model (2) indicates that in addition to the presence of inequalities of opportunity at school, the Cameroonian labor market has a non- meritocratic character. This non-meritocratic character is perceptible in the sense that the institutional sector affected is linked to that of the father. As our first hypothesis states, family background is a determining factor of positioning in the labor market. Indeed, the fact that the status of the father is linked both to the level of education attained and to access to the institutional sector of his offspring reveals this reality. It is useful to question the direction of variation of the association between the institutional sector of the father and that of the child according to the level of education attained. This will determine the role of education in this positioning scheme. It is important to remember that the constant association model assumes an inertia of association (OD) over the levels of education reached. According to this model, the parents' institutional sector influences children's access to institutional sectors in the same way, regardless of the level of education attained by the child. In the process of positioning in the labor market, education according to this model seems passive. To this end, it does not fight against the inequalities of opportunity present on this market. The constant association model has long been used to conclude on the inertia of education. This conclusion made solely on this basis has long been one of the criticisms made of these types of work. Indeed, they do not take into account the very often significant difference between the constant association model and the saturated model. The latest model indeed accurately reflects reality. To avoid this criticism, we question the role of education through another modeling (Unidiff modeling) of the third row of Table 1. This modeling is able to capture the association differences (OD) that can be found between the different levels of education reached. It can be seen that the Unidiff model better fits the real data observed whatever the year considered compared to the constant association model of the second line. Indeed, with regard to the percentage of people misclassified in 2005 compared to the reference model, we can see a decrease from 1.6 percent to 0.9 percent when we move from the constant association model to the Unidiff model, and from 0.5 percent to 0.4 percent in 2010. In addition, the differences in Bayes Information Criteria (BIC) between these two models are all greater than six in 2005 and in 2010. This thus leads to preferring the model Unidiff to that of constant association. We can thus say that in Cameroon, the level of education attained by the child is a factor which explains the intensity with which the institutional sector of the parents influences the access of their child to the institutional compartments of the labor market. The realities related to the inertia of education in the eviction of inequalities of access to the compartments of the labor market is not significant for the Cameroonian context. Moreover, it is important to question the direction of variation of the intensity of the association (OD) as the level of education increases. To this end, Figure 1 below shows the variation in the intensity of the OD association according to the modalities of the child's level of education. These modalities are considered by the intensity parameters of Unidiff. In this figure, we see the drop in the point estimates of the Unidiff parameters. This situation reveals that in Cameroon, the intensity of the influence of the institutional sector of the father on the labor market decreases with the level of education of the child. In other words, as the level of education of children increases, the inequalities of opportunity to access segments of the Cameroonian labor market decrease. The investment of parents in the education of their children therefore contributes to reducing inequalities of opportunity in the Cameroonian labor market. The fact of saying previously that the level of education attained depends on the status of the father explains that family origin and level of education are two complementary factors whose pooling determines the socioeconomic status of an individual. © 2022 Global Journals Volume XXII Issue III Version I 9 ( ) Global Journal of Human Social Science - Year 2022 E Family Capital and Professional Integration of Young Graduates in Cameroon