Global Journal of Human Social Science, F: Political Science, Volume 22 Issue 5

Israel, the Syrian Crisis and the Unbreakable Lebanese Syndrome Yusri Hazran Khaizran Abstract- This article addresses Israeli strategic attitude with respect to the Syrian crisis, linking the historical conc eptualization of Syria and its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict with Israel’s current strategic considerations and the effect of the “Lebanese syndrome” upon Israel’s historical collective memory. Syria has always been regarded as Israel’s archenemy due to its organic ties with revolutionary pan- Arabism and support for the struggle against the Jewish State. While Israel thus hoped that the “Arab Spring” uprisings would overthrow the Ba’ath regime or weakening it to the point of collapse, it has refrained from any military intervention, first and foremost because of what may be called the “Lebanese syndrome”—namely, the fear of renewed entanglement and a repeat of its bitter experience in the First Lebanon War. I. I srael and the “ A rab S pring” U prisings he popular uprisings that erupted in Tunisia and Egypt took Israeli political, military, and academic bodies by surprise. Long known for its intelligence capabilities, Israel had not anticipated their outbreak and the undermining of Western-backed dictatorships. Its first reaction was thus shock at the overthrow if regimes it had long regarded as moderate, anti-Islamic, pro-Western, and in favour of peace with Israel. Israeli scholarly institutions and figures promoted widely circulated arguments regarding the organic link between the Israeli military establishment and academics with a particular interest in Islamic and Middle Eastern studies. Israeli officialdom, media, and intellectual circles focused primarily on the events in Egypt, a neighbour of particular political, security, and economic relevance. While many feared the Islamic alternative in light of its potential impact upon the existing status quo, the outbreak of the revolution in Syria allayed Israel’s concerns, giving rise to hopes for the collapse of the “axis of evil” stretching from Tehran to Beirut. The Islamist rise to power in Syria, in contrast, was regarded as a form of compensation for the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak’s regime. Although Israel’s official reaction to the popular revolution in Tunisia was rather tepid, it sent a worrying signal regarding the uncertain fate of the region. The Israeli media and leadership exhibited little interest in the Tunisian revolution that ousted President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia being both geographical remote and playing a marginal role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel’s fear that the tide of popular uprisings would sweep across the Arab world began to change after the revolution erupted in Syria, however. Many regimes in the pay of or open to the West having already been overthrown March 2011, decision-making bodies in Israel viewing this as a threat to stability and a strategic shift threatening Israeli interests over the long term. Before the Syrian uprisings, the Israeli perception of the Arab popular uprisings had been melancholic, bleak, and pessimistic. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in September 2011, then Prime Minister Netanyahu extended his hand in peace to the Libyans and Tunisians in their attempt to establish democracy—as well as to the Syrians, Lebanese, and Iranians struggling against unjust oppressive regimes. Conspicuous for its a b sence in this speech was Egypt, Israeli’s peace partner. 1 Discussion of the outbreak of the uprisings in Syria and the ensuing civil war lies beyond our present brief, n um erous studies having already addressed this subject. 2 II. W hat is the L ebanese S yndrome? Still, to a large extent, the outbreak of the uprisings in Syria has been perceived as a form of “compensation” of sorts for the swift fall of the Mubarak regime—a supporter of stability in the region and promoter of peace. The longer the revolt has gone on, the more it has raised hopes in ruling Israeli circles that the regime’s fall would weaken Iran’s axis of evil. The two approaches are divided by an insurmountable fence—the bloody legacy of the Israeli Lebanese experience. The stamp this has imprinted on the Israeli historiographical discourse demonstrates the influence the Lebanese syndrome exerts. Known in Israeli public and academic discourse as the First Lebanon War, this campaign is both perceived and presented as forming part of Israel’s traumatic history. While this view finds expression in diverse contexts that lie beyond the scope of the present article, a number of historical details support the notion 1 Cited in Lior Lehrs, Egyptian Plague or Spring of Youth? The Israeli Discourse Regarding the Arab Spring (Tel Aviv: Metaphim Institute, 2013), 4. 2 For further information on the popular uprising in Syria, please to see: David Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad (New Haven, 2013); Radwan Ziadeh, “Revolution in Syria: The Struggle for freedom in Regional Battle” in: John Davis (ed.), The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy (London: 2013), pp. 93-111. T © 2022 Global Journals Volume XXII Issue V Version I 25 ( ) Global Journal of Human Social Science - Year 2022 F Author: Ph.D in Middle Eastern Studies, Shalem College and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus, 91905, Jerusalem, Israel. e-mails: yusri54@hotmail.com , yusri.khaizran@mail.huji.ac.il