Global Journal of Human Social Science, F: Political Science, Volume 22 Issue 5

entry into Lebanon. Israeli historiographical, media, and academic discourse regarding the Lebanon War also propounds that the human sacrifice was completely avoidable. Many Israeli public figures thus maintain that its instigators set unrealistic goals that exceeded Israel’s military and political capabilities—first and foremost, a new political order in Lebanon. As Schiffer observes: Israel’s ability to influence the establishment of a strong Lebanese government was an illusion—a government formed under Israel’s aegis that would last until the IDF left Lebanon. The Christians—of whatever denomination—only had a short-term interest in collaborating with Israel, nothing more. It is a mistake to think that the Christians are united in their worldview regarding what happens in Lebanon. Different factions exist that while appearing to cooperate with one another the moment the IDF departs and they have no one to depend on, will begin to argue amongst themselves. It is difficult to estimate the consequences . 9 Israeli sociologist Gadi Yatziv, one of the founders of the Peace Now movement that emerged as part of the public protest against the First Lebanon War, espouses a closely corresponding line. In his view, while Israel set itself unachievable goals from the outset, the primary decision- maker sought to frame it in broad political and strategic terms, even promising that it would yield great benefits. While it is impossible to know whether this was a form of self-deception or a hoodwinking of the public, it heavily underestimated the limitations of the use of force—a misconception under which the government labored virtually from the day the IDF crossed the Lebanese border until the Sabra and Shatila massacres. The efforts to “make order”—whether on a trivial or significant level— solely by force of arms, thereby imposing a “new political order,” electing a President, “cleansing territory,” defeating the PLO, and signing a peace agreement with Lebanon on the basis of one successful war were all considered great folly as early as the end of the twentieth century and the end of colonialism. Today, they lie completely beyond the pale—even with respect to the superpowers. With regard to Israel, they are axiomatic principles. The premise guiding the government being unfounded, the goals of the war were unattainable. The latter were multitudinous, changing in light of events on the ground. Beginning as a modest operation to preserve peace in the Galilee, the operation rapidly expanded into an attempt to resolve security and political issues (in some cases even succeeding in addressing global terror)—then reverting once again to a number of unclear aims formulated ambiguously and expressed half- heartedly . 10 Gemayel’s assassination in September 1982 opened up a Pandora’s box that compounded Israel’s entanglement in Lebanon, damaging its international 9 Shimon Schiffer, Snowball: The Story Behind the Lebanese War (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1984), 162 (Hebrew). 10 Gadi Yatziv, “The War that Should not Have Broken Out,” in Lebanon: The Other War , ed. Rubik Rosenthal (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poalim, 1983), 93 ‒ 94 (Hebrew). reputation, creating intolerable economic burdens, and deepening the internal split within Israeli society. The enmeshment derived from Israel’s incapacity to free itself from the yoke of its ongoing military presence in Lebanon devoid of any guiding strategic vision or direction. As Schiff and Ya’ari conclude: A year after the war, Israel began the struggle to extract itself from the Lebanese quagmire. Such processes are often difficult and painful, proper assessment of the whole campaign only being possible right at the end. Israel sought to withdraw in stages, the goal being to halt the ongoing toll while gradually relinquishing a large part of the aims Sharon had set. The immediate test was of the government’s ability to prevent this necessary step from becoming a total defeat, thereby weakening its position in future battles; to create a network and alliance in Lebanon going forward that would prevent Syrian patronage and a renewed terrorist base; and above all, to facilitate recovery and rehabilitation, both in the IDF and the political system, in order that such a war, in which Israel lost its way, its belief in its righteousness and confidence being shaken, would not recur . 11 At the end of the summer of 1983, Menahem Begin[’s] … estimations and expectations of furthering Israel’s interests and securing the country firmly within the historical borders of Eretz Israel had come to nothing. The pact with the Christians in Lebanon had proven to be a broken reed, the PLO had not been destroyed, the danger of a Palestinian State had not been averted, and above all the division and splits within the people in the wake of the number of casualties and fear of a potential civil war—the worst of all scenarios in Begin’s mind—all guided him in light of his moral motives to face reality and say with his last remaining breathe: I can’t go on. Two years after the war, in light of Begin’s deep disappointment that the war had not wiped out the PLO, established peace with Lebanon, and brought the idea of a Palestinian State to an end, Schiffer observed in similar vein: 12 5) The moral justification of the war also played a role. According to Arye Naor, Sharon’s plan focused on Maronite cooperation rather than the destruction of the PLO. Four months before he entered office, Sharon had asserted that Syria had taken over Lebanon and was committing genocide against the Christians. This constituting an Israeli red line, Israeli was morally-ideologically obligated to help the latter. 13 The linkage in the Israeli public’s mind between a war that was not theirs and the ethical illusion of saving the Christians from genocide helps to explain the frustration that underlies the historical Israeli reading of the Lebanon situation. Rather than needing to engage in a military campaign or react in self-defense, Israel initiated an offensive of its own free will— inter alia , in 11 Schiff and Ya’ari, War of Deception , 388. 12 Schiffer, Snowball , 164 ‒ 65. 13 Naor, Cabinet at War, 26. © 2022 Global Journals Volume XXII Issue V Version I 27 ( ) Global Journal of Human Social Science - Year 2022 F Israel, the Syrian Crisis and the Unbreakable Lebanese Syndrome