Global Journal of Human Social Science, F: Political Science, Volume 22 Issue 5

and extension of the second, it was also the last Arab State to sign the armistice agreements with Israel in 1949. 19 Sela’s analysis closely parallels that of Prof. Moshe Ma’oz, who maintains that, despite its modest military capabilities, Syria took the lead in declaring an economic boycott of Israel and becoming the first Arab State to implement the LAS resolutions on the deployment of military forces on the border . 20 Following earlier scholars, Zisser points to Syria’s ideological hostility as a hallmark of its attitude towards Israel and one of the central factors behind the eruption of the 1967 war. Deriving from Ba’ath principles, it is embodied in Damascus’ refusal to recognize Israel’s right of existence and engage in any negotiations to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict. Even more important for our present purposes, it also forms part of the propaganda rhetoric that includes calls for wiping Israel off the map and a series of militant Syrian moves. 21 Syrian unification with Egypt was an unprecedented event in modern history, two non-neighbouring countries unifying at the behest of the smaller. Although due to current circumstances and short lived, its roots lay deep in Syrian public consciousness, Damascus always being the prime object of any aspiration to create a great Arab or Muslim nation, constituting the active center and projector of unification . The idea that Syria serves as a stronghold of enmity towards Israel cannot be separated from the existing links between Syria and pan-Arabism, particularly in the wake of the establishment of the United Arab Republic. As Be’eri observes: 22 Itamar Rabinovich holds Syria primarily to blame for the collapse of the peace negotiations during the 1990s. 23 According to the latter, Asad rejected the Israeli scheme and its economic aspects as directed against Arab nationalism. Forcibly dragged into the peace process, he negotiated with Israel “resentfully and grudgingly because it was something he had been forced to do.” 24 19 Ibid, 51. 20 Moshe Ma’oz, Syria: To Arabism and Back (Ra’anana: Open University Press, 2011), 46 ‒ 48 (Hebrew). 21 Eyal Zisser, “Syria – From the Six-Day War to the Syrian Civil War,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44.4 (2017): 545 ‒ 58. 22 Eliezer Be’eri, The Officer Class in Politics and Society of the Arab East (Tel Aviv: Workers’ Book-Guild, 1966), 100 (Hebrew). Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 100. 23 Itamar Rabinovich, The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs, and the Middle East, 1948–2011 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 264. 24 Ibid. Rabinovich thus portrays him as a reluctant peacemaker who only agreed to what he could not avoid, displaying his dissatisfaction with the way the political process was proceeding. Although Arab nationalism, Arab unity, revolution and Ba’athism have lost prestige in the Arab world, these principles are anchored in Syrian national identity and politics. Asad was thus expected to toe the line. 25 The antithesis of Anwar al-Sadat, who was characterized by his vision of peace and reconciliation, he was a cautious tactician, his refusal to meet with his Israeli interlocutors and the severe restrictions he imposed on the negotiators obstructing the negotiations. 26 These historical reviews of Syria’s initial positions towards the conflict in Palestine give weight to the dominant Orientalist perspective regarding Syria and its leading role in the conflict with Zionism and Israel. This perception thus supports the claim made within Israeli Orientalist and decision-making circles that Syria is a tenacious foe. Creative security strategic thinking being required to remove the threat to Israel posed by Syria and everything for which it stands, projects for fragmenting Syria commenced . 27 IV. D ismantling the “ A xis of E vil” Israel did not hide its glee over the uprising against the Assad regime—long regarded as the key link in the axis of evil extending from Tehran to Beirut. In December 2011, then Minister of Defence Ehud Barak optimistically announced that the Assad regime was so precarious that it would fall within a few weeks, fatally undermining the Iran-Hizballah axis . 28 From an Israeli perspective, he was convinced that it was better for the Baath regime to collapse than survive, even if the price was Hizballah gaining chemical weapons—the ultimate effect being a weak Iran . 29 Amos Gilead, political and security Head of Section at the Ministry of Defence, expressed a similar view. Underestimating the threat jihadist organisations might have posed if Islamists had taken power in Syria, he observed that “with due respect to such a danger, the threat posed by the Iran-Syria-Hizballah axis is much greater to Israel. ” 30 25 Ibid, 264 ‒ 65. 26 Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: Israel and Syria, 1992-1996 (Tel-Aviv: Miskal, 1998), 323 ‒ 34 (Hebrew). 27 Conceptualizing Syria as stronghold of animosity and antagonism towards Israel; led Israeli officials to suggest plans for disintegration of the Syrian state; see: Yusri Hazran, “A people that shall dwell alone: is that so? Israel and the minorities alliance” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 56, Issue 3 (2020), pp. 396-411. 28 Lahav Harkov, “Barak: Assad will be toppled within weeks,” Haaretz , 2 January, 2012 (Hebrew). 29 “Ehud Barak: “Better for Assad to fall even if Hizballah get chemical weapons,” Globes , 22 August, 2011 (Hebrew). 30 Amon Gilead, “Al-Qaeda activists waiting for the chance to take over Syria,” Walla News , 2 April, 2013: http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/ 9/2629 505 (Hebrew). In reality, Israel is well aware of the risks involved if the Syrian regime does fall, the northern front having been quiet for the past four decades. Such a scenario would also raise questions regarding the future of its arsenal of strategic weapons (including long range missiles), the disintegration of the Syrian state, and instability along Israel’s northern border. © 2022 Global Journals Volume XXII Issue V Version I 29 ( ) Global Journal of Human Social Science - Year 2022 F Israel, the Syrian Crisis and the Unbreakable Lebanese Syndrome