Global Journal of Human Social Science, F: Political Science, Volume 22 Issue 5

This gloating over Syria’s fate has not turned into holistic intervention, however. Contra frequent statements, this circumstance does not reflect the fact that Israelis favour the regime’s survival over its overthrow. According to Elie Podeh and Moshe Maoz, the trend prevalent within the Israeli public and ruling circles reflects the belief that the uprisings serve Israeli strategic interests, it thus being better for the two sides—the regime and the opposition—to continue fighting. In their view, the ongoing revolt and war suggest that the significant weakening of the Syrian army, the erosion of Hezbollah’s power, the chemical weapons disarmament, and the regime’s cutting of ties with Hamas all favour Israeli strategic interests. Both the official echelons and Israeli public hope that the regime will be replaced and the wish that it remains in a weakened state are predicated on the decision not to become directly involved in the war. The imprint of the Lebanese syndrome upon the Israeli consciousness functions as a real deterrent against any direct military intervention that might smack of the 1982 entanglement . 41 Some Israeli analysts nevertheless take a different line, maintaining that the question of whether the regime is overthrown or survives is a marginal issue, overridden by two other issues: 1) preventing takfiri jihadist organisations from gaining access to the Israeli border; and 2) thwarting Iran and its allied militias from penetrating Syria, particularly along the border. This policy rested on the so-called “the devil we know” principle—namely, that the survival of the Syrian regime is preferable to its removal. Then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon articulated this vision in opposing then US President George Bush’s proposal to move from Iraq into Syria in order to oust the subsidiary Ba’ath regime in Syria. In his view, “The devil that we know” was better than any alternative or unknown future, particularly in light of Syria’s incapacity to launch a military attack against Israel. 42 This policy began showing cracks in the aftermath of the Second Lebanese War, however. To Israelis, this reflected the depth of the strategic alliance between the Iran-led axes in the region. A central figure in the security and diplomatic establishment in Israel, Itamar Rabinovich, identified two schools of thought regarding the preferred Israeli outcome of the Syrian crisis: a) the regime’s downfall was the best option for Israel in the long term, implying a weakened Hizballah and Iran in the region; and b) Although Rabinovich 41 Elie Podeh and Moshe Maoz, Bashir Against Bashar: The Failure of the Popular uprising in Syria and ite Implication” in: Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler (eds.), The Third Wave- Protest and Revolution in the Middle East (Jerusalem: Karmel, 2017), pp. 167 ‒ 68 (Hebrew). 42 Itamar Rabinovich. “The devil we know: The Israeli vision of the future of Assad’s regime,” A View from Above 427 (2019): 1 ‒ 2 (Hebrew). espoused the second view, he warned against the consequences of getting involved, arguing that Israel’s security and strategic interests must be maintained without any Israeli presence in Syrian territory . 43 The cautionary approach promoted by Rabinovich regarding Syria, undoubtedly reminds of the circumspect strategy adopted by Yizhak Rabin towards the Lebanese crisis of the 1970s; based on the principle of non-military intervention in Lebanon and “helping the Christians to help themselves.” 44 In any case, those calling for shunning involvement in Syria or those hoping Bashar will stay in power have begun to be replaced by others urging that it would be best for Israel, and likewise the US and other Western countries, to let Bashar continue to bleed, and it may even be best if he falls, for that would weaken the radical axis in the Middle East, which would serve Israeli interests . Zisser’s reading constitutes a continuation to that of his former. The regime’s fall is perceived as undermining the axis of evil. In the words of Eyal Zisser: 45 This reading corresponds to that of Itamar Rabinovich, expert in Syrian affairs, chief negotiator, and director of negotiations under the second Rabin government. Rabinovich posited that Israel had two options: not to intervene and preserve its critical interests or to aid armed opposition and expedite the overthrow of the regime. While the Israeli leadership was expected to adopt the second, in particular in light of the growing Iranian presence, the weak opposition and fear of repeating the Lebanese spectacle overrode the temptation to intervene in the Syrian crisis and attempt to determine the Ba’ath regime’s fate. 46 Not everyone accepts Rabinovich’s pessimistic outlook and focus on Iran’s growing influence and Hizballah’s enhanced combat capacity. Some believe that developments in the Syrian uprising favour Israel’s security and military interests, the revolution not only destroying the Syrian infrastructure and economy but also reducing Syria’s human, military, and combat capacities. The Syrian armed forces have dropped in number from around 290,000 at the time the revolution erupted to some 90,000 soldiers and combatants, almost 2,000 tanks and 60 percent of the air force capability also being lost. The Syrian revolution and descent into civil war have thus removed the last traditional threat to the security of the Jewish State, no 43 Ibid. 44 45 Eyal Zisser, “The Crisis in Syria: Threats and Opportunities for Israel,” in Strategic Survey for Israel, 2012 ‒ 2013 , ed. Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2013), 181. 46 Itamar Rabinovich. “The USA and Israel in the face of Syria of Bashar al-Assad: Challenges, Dilemmas, and Options,” Landscape of Policies 23.4 (2020): 69 ‒ 71: https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the- united-states-and-israel-vs-the-syria-of-bashar-al-assad-challenges- dilemmas-and-options/ © 2022 Global Journals Volume XXII Issue V Version I 31 ( ) Global Journal of Human Social Science - Year 2022 F Israel, the Syrian Crisis and the Unbreakable Lebanese Syndrome