Global Journal of Human Social Science, F: Political Science, Volume 22 Issue 5

Arab army posing a threat to its security in either the short or the medium term. 47 In spite of its apprehensions over being dragged into the simmering conflict in Syria, Israel eventually made its options clear, preferring any alternative to the continued existence of the Iran- and Hizballah-allied Ba’ath regime—even if these involved Islamist jihadist organisations. The worst case scenario was that the regime survived. In late 2017, the BBC and Haaretz released a detailed report regarding Operation Good Fence launched by the IDF in the Golan Heights in 2013. The special army unit created was tasked with liaising with the armed opposition groups and providing logistical and health assistance to these and Syrian civilians in the Syrian Golan Heights. Between 2013 and 2017, Israeli hospitals admitted some 4,000 injured Syrians, mostly young men wounded in combat. Israel adopted a proactive course of action, constructing a wall and opening up communications with the armed opposition groups in the Golan Heights with a view to maintaining the status quo in the border area and preventing the return of government forces. As Iranian military intervention and Hizballah engagement in the fight against the Syrian opposition increased, Israel’s concerns became more acute, its policy shifting from liaison to the extension of aid and assistance to opposition groups on the principle that “half a loaf is better than none”: all alternatives—namely, return of the regime forces to the border area—are the lesser of two evils. 48 According to an IDF statement, it delivered 450,000 litres of fuel, 50,000 tonnes of clothes, and 113,000 tonnes of food supplies to these elements. In addition to erecting a field hospital, it also paid monthly wages to combatants—the Fursan al-Joulan (Knights of the Golan) commander acknowledging that he had been paid US$5,000. 49 Israel took no pains to conceal that it was motivated by more than purely humanitarian concerns, openly claiming coordination with opposition groups, including both Islamist and jihadist factions. Not only did it share the goal of overthrowing the Ba’ath regime with the Syrian opposition in all its form, orientations, and rationales, but the Good Fence operation also sought to win over the local population and refugees fleeing undesirable elements, the Syrian government, and allied groups. Israel’s interest explicitly lay in creating a buffer 47 Avi Jager, “Syria: The Decline of the Last Conventional Threat,” BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,707 (2020): 1 ‒ 4. 48 See Sam McNeil, “Israel treating thousands of Syrians injured in war,” The Independent , 8 April, 2017: https://www.independent.co.uk/ author/sam-mcneil 49 See BBC Arabic, “Israeli Good Fence operation in the Syrian Golan Heights,” 15 November, 2017: https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middle east-41975936 (Arabic); see also: Udi Dekel, Nir Boms and Ofir Winter, Syria: New Map, New Actor (Tel-Aviv: INSS, 2015), P. 28; Amos Haarel, “The aid which IDF provides to the inhabitants of villages in the Golan Heights- not altruism, still comandable” Haaretz, 19 July 2017. zone along the Israeli-Syrian border that would be empty of Syrian army personnel, pro-regime militias, Lebanese Hizballah members, and other forces allied with Iran. The complexity and interweaving of the deterrent effect of the Lebanese syndrome and conceptualization of Syria as a stronghold of hostility and hatred towards Israel with the view that the uprisings form a historic opportunity for bringing about strategic change in Israel’s favor is clearly reflected in Eyal Zisser’s analysis of the events. This assumes even greater significance in light of the fact that Zisser embodies the link between academic Orientalism and the security establishment: The reality that has engulfed Syria since the outbreak of the uprising against Bashar al-Assad’s regime presents a host of complex dilemmas for Israel. Jerusalem may have seen the Syrian regime as hostile, if not dangerous, due to its membership in the axis of evil, along with Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas. Nonetheless, the same regime made sure to maintain total quiet along the shared border in the Golan Heights ... True, the fall of Bashar’s regime could deal a severe blow to Iran and Hizbollah, but at the same time, it could enable al-Qaeda-inspired terror elements to establish themselves along the Syria-Israel border ... 50 V. C onclusion The outbreak of the Syrian uprising marked a paradigmatic shift in the Israeli perspective on the Arab uprisings, offering a real glimmer of hope of the collapse of the Tehran-led “axis of evil.” In an attempt to explore the outcome of the Syrian crisis from an Israeli perspective, Ehud Yaari, an experienced Israeli journalist, argues that Israel emerged empty-handed from the crisis in Syria. Against all predictions, the regime has survived, the Iranian military presence continues, and Hizballah combat cells and units have taken up positions within Syria and along the border. According to Yaari, Israel committed a strategic blunder in failing to intervene in the Syrian civil war and deal a deathblow to the Ba’ath regime . 51 The imminent end of the civil war in Syria has prompted a sense amongst some Israelis of having missed an opportunity—the feeling that the country has refrained from intervening in a neighbouring country in order to overthrow Assad’s regime and thereby strike a decisive blow against the axis of evil (Iran and Hezbollah), perhaps even shaping a new order in its image and according to its desires . Z isser similarly implies that Israel has missed a historic opportunity in taking the strategic decision not to intervene militarily in the Syrian civil war, thereby averting Assad’s overthrow: 52 50 Eyal Zisser, “The Crisis in Syria: Threats and Opportunities for Israel,” in Strategic Survey for Israel, 2012 ‒ 2013 , ed. Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2013), 168. 51 Ehud Yaari’s lecture, given at The Shalem Academic College at Jerusalem, December, 4, 2019. 52 Eyal Zisser, Syria at War: The Rise and Fall of the Revolution in Syria (Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 2020), 368 (Hebrew). The © 2022 Global Journals Volume XXII Issue V Version I 32 ( ) Global Journal of Human Social Science - Year 2022 F Israel, the Syrian Crisis and the Unbreakable Lebanese Syndrome