Global Journal of Human Social Science, F: Political Science, Volume 22 Issue 5

reason for this, in his view, is the fact that “burned by the Lebanese experiment, Israeli leadership, both political and military is wary of interfering in any way in a neighbouring country. ” 53 In a report published on the ten-year anniversary of the outbreak of the uprisings/war in Syria, the authors—members of the Institute for National Although Israel decided not to intervene, either directly or covertly, in surrounding events unless its security interests were threatened, Israel was aware of the effect of taking military action against the regime. Its reluctance derives from strategic constraints rather than constituting a strategic option. Not reconciling its elation over the collapse of Syrian state sovereignty with the regime’s authority, it did not intervene to finish off the regime out of fear of the Lebanese syndrome. Israel increasingly wished for the breakdown of the Ba’ath regime. Still, the anxiety from the recurrence of the Lebanese syndrome has pound Israel’s hands and limited its strategic options. This decision of non- intervention was reinforced by the fact that Syria is now no longer its most potent adversary. The inevitable affiliation between Syria, “the stronghold of animosity” towards Israel, and the strategic alliances of the Ba’ath Regime with Iran and Hezbollah, makes it so that the downfall of the regime is a strategic and even national aspiration for Israel. Israel’s governmental and media circles had exhibited much sympathy towards the uprising however, the state refrained from any active involvement against the regime. The fear of repeating “the Lebanon Syndrome,” In which the military is dragged into the chaos of a civil war was the reason no ambition to get the Israeli military involved arose. Thus, Israel had abstained from taking military action that could have potentially weakened elements that are hostile to Israel. Despite the trend prompted by numerous cautions, the attitude taken by high-ranking officials, and prominent positions in the Israeli public sphere, Israeli scholars contend that public and governmental circles in the country adopt one of two approaches: a) a clear preference for replacing Assad’s regime due to the weakening of the “axis of evil”; and b) the regime, even if injured and bloodied, still serves Israeli interests, the continued uprisings and war further undermining its status and thus preventing it from posing a conventional threat to Israel. In both cases, Israel refuses to become directly involved militarily in the conflict in Syria. This stance is an immediate consequence of Israel’s longstanding entanglement in Lebanon. Israeli military invention in the Lebanese second civil war in an attempt to influence Lebanese politics having been an abject failure, the State has become very wary of any “adventures” that might drag it into the “Lebanese quagmire” a second time (the first being in 1982). 53 Ibid. Security Studies—recommended that Israel should take a dramatically new approach to Syria, abandoning the traditional attitude of sitting on the fence in favour of intervening in three strategically important regions— southern Syria, north-eastern Syria, and the Syrian- Lebanese border. According to this report, the present reality demands a reassessment of Israeli policy, non- involvement having become implausible on three grounds related to remaining of Assad in power and the increasing of Iranian involvement in Syria. 54 T he report recommends that the Israeli government encourage and promote a broad initiative for removing Assad from power in exchange for international restraint and the Gulf States’ support for Syria’s rehabilitation. On this view, Israel must take short-term risks to prevent Iran from taking control of Syria—namely, increasing its involvement in the three regions noted above. Israel has benefited from the developments of the Syrian crisis; nonetheless the reluctance from land one last blow on the regime can’t be disconnected from the bloody heritage of the Lebanese syndrome. © 2022 Global Journals Volume XXII Issue V Version I 33 ( ) Global Journal of Human Social Science - Year 2022 F Israel, the Syrian Crisis and the Unbreakable Lebanese Syndrome 54 Udi Dekel & Carmit Valensi, “After a Decade of War in Syria, Israel Should Change ite Policy” INSS Insight, No. 1451 (April, 2021), pp. 5-6.