Global Journal of Human Social Science, F: Political Science, Volume 23 Issue 6

further exacerbated by an increase in poverty and social inequality. This period was marked by political instability due to then-president Evo Morales' attempt at a fourth re-election. Between 2017 and 2021, as shown in Figure 3, there was again a downward trend in homicide rates, which can be attributed both to political changes and the impeachment of Morales and to improvements in the economy. However, these factors do not have sufficient explanatory power to account for why Bolivia has the lowest homicide rates despite being the worst- ranked country in the democracy indices among the four analyzed. V. D iscussion Although the literature on the quality of democracy predominantly focuses on the fragility of institutions as a relevant factor in homicide rates, the data from Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia indicate that the weight of this factor needs to be further considered. It is difficult to pinpoint the precise causes of homicide and its rate of occurrence – in part due to the way that each society constructs its perception of the role of state institutions. Equally complex is the task of capturing the subtleties present in how different societies attribute guilt to those responsible for homicides and how these events become part of the public record. Although we might agree that the quality of democracy is related to the robustness of its institutions, and that these can play a relevant role in homicide rates, we must be careful not to make statements which can be easily challenged by data, as is the case with the countries analyzed. Without these precautions, one could make the mistake of presenting a partial and therefore inadequate picture of the homicide problem in different countries. We would, in this case, be purposely ignoring the differences imposed by facts; here, the data presented do not confirm a possible link between weak democracies or weakened institutions and homicide rates. Therein lies what we referred to at the beginning of this article as the paradox of homicide rates in Latin America. This approach, that centered on the idea of institutional weakness, fails to accurately capture the multi-causality of homicide rates, which are characterized by a degree of subjectivity that only qualitative research can more accurately explain; without this, data show merely generic and distorted panoramas. Data gained from international agencies, such as those used in this work, represent an essentially quantitative approach; this method proved to have a weak and generic explanatory power. In fact, as the data from the countries analyzed clearly show, the quality of democracy alone does not define trends in homicide rates. This quality appears as just one of the constitutive factors among many others involved in the dynamics of homicides. We must question how the homicide phenomenon is usually portrayed; an inaccurate representation can lead to the formulation of public policies that are disconnected from the reality of the factors that contribute to homicide rates. For this reason, such policies become inefficient and irrelevant. We must challenge ourselves to consider why countries like Peru and Bolivia, which rank behind Brazil and Colombia in the ranking of democracies, have significantly lower homicide rates than the latter. VI. C onclusion This study sought to examine the complex relationship between the quality of democracy and homicide rates in four Latin American countries: Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Throughout the analysis, significant variations were observed in the overall scores with downward trends for some countries; this represents a challenge, as weaker democracies were shown to have lower homicide rates. Although studies aimed at elucidating factors responsible for homicide rates often state that several variables contribute to this phenomenon, the fragility of democracy is still the main factor attributed to high rates. Yet, these studies fail to account for the contradiction that exists between these theoretical premises and data that show that homicide rates are lower in countries with weaker democracies. This apparent contradiction suggests that the relationship between democracy and homicides is intricate and multifaceted. In addition to the strength of institutions and the quality of democracy, factors such as security policies, policing strategies, crime prevention programs and anti-drug trafficking policies play a significant role in determining rates. Socio-economic status, income inequality, access to education, employment and health services also influence the homicide rates. In addition, historical contexts of social conflicts, political polarization and the influence of transnational criminal organizations, such as drug cartels and organized crime groups, cannot be ignored. The ability of these groups to operate in a country and the effectiveness of government measures to combat them certainly have an important bearing on homicide rates. However, a comprehensive understanding of the disparity in rates between countries requires a multidisciplinary approach that takes into account, not only the quality of democracy and the strength of institutions, but also a series of other interconnected variables of a subjective nature. Analyzing these factors in isolation is not enough to explain the complex dynamics of violence and homicide in Latin America. On © 2023 Global Journals Volume XXIII Issue VI Version I 36 Global Journal of Human Social Science - Year 2023 ( ) F Homicide Rates in Fragile Democracies: Reflections on the Paradoxes of Latin America