Global Journal of Human Social Science, G: Linguistics and Education, Volume 22 Issue 4

public affair supports the implementation of ME especially in the public school. If morality were a private affair and moral decisions were to affect only ‘the doer’ of the act, then implementing ME in public education would be an absurdity. Two, in teaching ME, teachers are bound to encounter moral dilemmas. This calls for a thorough understanding of the evolutionary nature of morality and the broad spectrum of moral concepts so that moral decisions that are arrived at may be dependable and authentic since they are propounded on the best moral considerations. This is likely to guard against shallow ethical considerations (subjectivism). Three, the tenets place moral decisions as an individual responsibility. To habituate children toward moral values is to train their individual appetites. It must be understood that moral training targets the affective domain of the students. IV. M oral T raining in a S chool S etup, S ome P hilosophical R eflections It has ben observed in the preceding paragraph that moral education should entail moral habituation in some sense. This should entail trainini the appetites of children. What does training appetite imply and how does it influence moral development? To explain the concept of ‘training one’s appetite’ albeit briefly, Aristotle’s notion of pathe is in handy. The Greek term pathe was used by Aristotle to refer to appetite. Appetites are actions that have psychological effects (affect the mind) and can be described by such words as anger, fear, confidence, joy, love, hatred, and the like. Accordingly, to train a person in morality will mean to train his/her pathe towards self-control . To train one in pathos is to guide them to control their pathe beyond mere emotions and feeling of the moment such as pleasure and pain in the physical sense. The pathos of Aristotle is thus being able to listen and being guided by reason. Accordingly, ME would imply training the pathe of learners to listen and be guided by reason. Training in this instance implies that pathe should take both the affective and the cognitive domain. Indeed, Aristotle demonstrated that moral excellence is a hexis of pathe (Dow, 1998). It should be understood that Aristotle had early on argued that moral development is preceded by the development of intellectual virtues. In particular, he had observed that morality is not taught or given by way of verbal instruction. Moral training entails the training of the intellect (mind) into understanding the real nature of the universe and the purpose of human life. He argued that the purpose of life is to have a good life. The Greek word for a good life is eudaimonia meaning happiness. A further reflection on ME reveals that moral decision making process is a human condition. This condition is nourished the presence of free will. The expression ‘free will’ refers to informed consent in respect of human action or inaction. In the educational context, ME is traceable from the concept of morality itself. As such, moral education is seen as the object for which education is deliberately intended to assist in bringing about. These goals are intended to lead to the desired qualities of acceptable humanity in society. In other words, ME is intended to bring about moral ‘goodness’ as opposed to ‘immorality’ (moral badness) as already expressed. Bansikiza (2001) observes that morality is a path that is travelled for the purpose of purifying and refining human beings in their operations so that they may live a good life. On the contrary, immorality is a path that if travelled would corrupt, debase, and barbarize human beings in their conduct, thus leading to a life of misery and suffering. The notion of ME rests on the assumption that morals can be acquired through education; they are not genetically determined. Human experiences seem to support this assumption. It is a known fact that sons of clergy never automatically become clergy themselves, if they are not brought up through teaching and training to travel in that path. That is why effective development of good morals in the youth requires careful implementation of ME. Besides, it would be prudent to consider whether the morals that are intended to be imparted among the youth require well-articulated ME with clearly spelt out morals that are compelling and appealing sense of morality from the point of view of the society. Thus, the term compelling insinuates a set of moral standards that are bound to be followed as a duty, that is, legislated and by-laws, while the term appealing touches on one’s interpretation and beliefs regarding the socially set standards that a person judges as reasonable, justifiable and worth of observing. The appealing criterion plays a central role in moral development of the youth. Unless the youth believe that the societal norms are worthy of following; unless they are convinced that the societal moral standards and customs are justifiable and reasonable, an attempt by educational institutions to teach and habituate learners on societal norms may not be successful. For effective moral development of the youth, it is imperative that they be active participants in the process of formulating ME curriculum. Their active participation enables them feel part and parcel of the process; that is, they begin by examining the societal morals as their own and not as something being imposed upon them from without. This is why the appealing criterion in the formulation of ME is significant in that it assists learners to internalize moral norms and values, making them intrinsically motivated to conform to the social demands. Studies by psychologists such as Piaget and Kohlberg have demonstrated that human beings are not born morally mature but rather gradually develop morally, through teaching and habituation. Aristotelian theory of moral excellence and eudaimonia similarly © 2022 Global Journals Volume XXII Issue IV Version I 31 ( ) Global Journal of Human Social Science - Year 2022 G Implementation of Moral Education in Kenyan Schools: A Possibility or an Illusion? Some Critical Reflections