Global Journal of Management and Business Research, A: Administration and Management, Volume 22 Issue 8

compared to PRIVATE and PCHINEXT. The results of CFOA provide support for hypothesis H1. The results of OCS show that the operating costs of PRIVATE controlled firms and PCHINEXT are slightly lower than the SOECGs and SOELGs. The results of OCS provide support for hypothesis H3. Results for Tobin’s Q suggest that PRIVATE controlled firms have higher market value compared to SOECGs and SOELGs. Thus this finding does not provide support for hypotheses H4 and H5. The cross-sectional results reported in Table IV Panel C show that PRIVATE controlled firms perform better than SOECGs and SOELGs. In the period 2005 – 2008, however, according to all performance measures SOECGs performed better than SOELGs but from 2009 to 2012, SOELGs achieved better performance than SOECGs. Our results suggest that SASAC 2003 has had a positive effect on SOELG performance. Table 4: Operating Performance of Publicly Listed Firms with Different Types of Largest Shareholder SOECG SOELG PRIVATE PCHINEXT ALL Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Panel A: Overall Performance ROA 5.60% 5.29% 5.78% 5.39% 6.79% 6.60% 8.61% 8.49% 6.33% 5.90% CFOA 4.88% 4.61% 5.43% 5.31% 3.88% 3.96% 1.94% 2.74% 4.50% 4.51% SPROD 2.905 1.242 4.386 1.214 2.357 1.085 1.931 1.472 3.171 1.176 OCS 0.795 0.825 0.758 0.798 0.735 0.770 0.592 0.627 0.745 0.781 Tobin’s Q 2.117 1.636 1.996 1.996 2.641 2.008 2.812 2.404 2.328 1.786 Panel B: Test of Differences in Mean and Median of Different Performance Measures SOECG vs SOELG SOECG vs PRIVATE SOECG vs PCHINEXT SOELG vs PRIVATE SOELG vs PCHINEXT Mean a Median b Mean a Median b Mean a Median b Mean a Median b Mean a Median b ROA 0.459 2.187** 3.805*** 8.794*** 6.505*** 10.343*** 1.099 8.667*** 4.451*** 9.604*** CFOA 2.574** 3.687*** -4.179*** 4.069*** -9.164*** 8.993*** -8.587*** 9.837*** - 11.003*** 12.301*** SPROD 3.954*** 0.552 -3.324*** 6.759*** -3.055*** 4.075*** -8.704*** 7.378*** -4.197*** 4.404*** OCS -8.528*** 8.546*** - 13.970*** 15.530*** - 31.186*** 27.326*** -6.546*** 8.329*** - 24.461*** 24.104*** Tobin’s Q -3.127*** 4.519*** 10.024*** 13.118*** 11.759*** 16.926*** 16.980*** 23.290*** 14.185*** 21.806*** Panel C: Accounting Indicator and Market Measure of Performance by Year Year Observations SOECG SOELG PRIVATE PCHINEXT ALL Mean a Tobin’s Q Mean a Tobin’s Q Mean a Tobin’s Q Mean a Tobin’s Q Mean a Tobin’s Q 2005 1246 4.94% 1.313 3.96% 1.272 -0.64% 1.456 2.51% 1.345 2006 1402 5.88% 1.784 5.29% 1.621 4.01% 1.925 4.94% 1.760 2007 1489 7.54% 3.455 7.50% 3.193 8.95% 3.988 8.06% 3.548 2008 1502 5.13% 1.495 4.98% 1.480 6.10% 1.913 5.46% 1.658 2009 1503 4.81% 2.551 5.10% 2.548 7.42% 3.620 13.01% 5.136 6.16% 3.039 2010 1708 6.42% 2.797 7.17% 2.487 8.82% 3.736 10.01% 4.235 7.98% 3.205 2011 2045 5.56% 1.803 6.28% 1.723 8.36% 2.224 8.93% 2.475 7.42% 2.047 2012 2534 4.66% 1.675 5.80% 1.633 7.04% 2.113 7.36% 2.271 6.43% 1.943 Table IV Panel A reports a series of financial measures of operating performance for companies clustered according to different identities. ROA/CFOA is operating earnings/cash flows deflated by the average book value of total assets. SPROD is the ratio of net sales to the number of employees in millions of RMB. OCS is the ratio of operating cost to net sales. Tobin’s Q is the market value of total assets deflated by the average book value of total assets, where the market value of total assets is the sum of monthly average market capitalization and average total debts. Table III Panel B represents the statistical differences from 0 in the T-test for means and in the Mann-Whitney U-test for medians at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (marked ***, ** and *). indicates the T-value from the T-test of differences in means; indicates the Z-value from the Mann-Whitney U-test of differences in medians; and Table IV Panel C reports the average value of ROA and Tobin’s Q for each type of ownership by years. Table V reports the regression results for Equation (1). The results reported in Table V show that the coefficients of the owner type/identity variables are statistically significant for the performance measures ROA, CFOA, SPROD, and Tobin’s Q, thus suggesting that ownership identity does matter. Our results suggest that as the largest owner of SOECGs, the central government has a positive effect on firm performance, The Relationship between Ownership Identity, Ownership Concentration, and Firm Performance: Evidence from China 21 Global Journal of Management and Business Research Volume XXII Issue VIII Version I Year 2022 ( ) A © 2022 Global Journals