Global Journal of Management and Business Research, A: Administration and Management, Volume 22 Issue 8

measured by CFOA and Tobin’s Q. For CFOA and SPROD, our results indicate that local governments have played an active role in the management of SOELGs after gaining ownership rights as a result of the recent SASAC reform. The coefficient of DSOELG is negative and statistically significant at a 1% level for the performance measure Tobin’s Q. This finding is consistent with that reported by Zou et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2009) that SOELGs experience negative market reactions compared to SOECGs and PRIVATEs. In regard to PRIVATEs, our results are positive for the performance measures ROA, CFOA, and Tobin’s Q. The coefficient of SIZE is positive and statistically significant for all the accounting based performance measures, thus suggesting that larger firms are better at exploiting economies of scale and have access to capital on more favorable terms. However, the negative coefficient of SIZE for Tobin’s Q suggests that investors are concerned about the agency problems existing in larger firms and therefore favor smaller firms instead (Jiang et al., 2008). The coefficient of LEV is negative for the accounting-based measures but positive for the operating efficiency, productivity, and market measures, which suggest that firms that take on leverage are better governed and have better growth prospects. The coefficient of IORA is positive for both ROA and Tobin’s Q, thus suggesting that firms that experience growth generate better returns for the shareholders. The positive coefficient of DEVELOP1 suggests that firms that operate in developed regions benefit from better developed regional business institutions and infrastructure (Fan et al., 2001; Qian & Stiglitz, 1996). Table 5: Pooled OLS Regression Analysis of Operating Performance on Ownership Type/Identity Profitability Operating Efficiency Productivity Market Performance Dependent ROA CFOA OCS SPROD Tobin’s Q Constant -0.186*** [0.22] -0.019 [0.014] 1.34 [1.19] -13.446*** [0.737] 14.428*** [0.252] DSOECG -0.007† [0.004] 0.005** [0.002] -0.204 [0.196] -0.167 [0.121] 0.117*** [0.039] DSOELG -0.002 [0.003] 0.011*** [0.002] -0.158 [0.152] 0.452*** [0.094] -0.178*** [-0.030] DPRIVATE 0.006† [0.004] 0.005** [0.002] 0.204 [0.196] 0.167 [0.121] 0.190*** [0.029] SIZE 0.012*** [0.002] 0.004*** [0.001] -0.007 [0.057] 0.656*** [0.035] -0.614*** [0.011] LEV -0.103*** [0.003] -0.007*** [0.002] 0.472*** [0.138] 0.427*** [0.085] 0.946*** [0.027] IORA 0.020*** [0.002] -0.005 [0.001] 0.014 [0.109] -0.082 [0.067] 0.271*** [0.021] DEVELOPI 0.005** [0.002] -0.003† [0.002] -0.414*** [0.130] 0.966*** [0.080] 0.081*** [0.026] Industry dummies no no no no no Firm-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes F-statistics (P-value) 171.41*** (0.000) 31.99*** (0.000) 3.12*** (0.000) 52.41*** (0.000) 609.66*** (0.000) R2 (Adj. R 2 ) 0.144 (0.143) 0.031 (0.023) 0.030 (0.021) 0.059 (0.048) 0.374 (0.374) Durbin-Watson 2.016 1.428 1.786 0.457 1.085 13273 Notes: The Model: OpPerform = 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + where OpPerform is the performance measure, including ROA, CFOA, OCS, SPROD and Tobin’s Q. DSOECG is a dummy variable coded 1 for firms whose biggest shareholder is a SOE affiliated to the central government. DSOELG is a dummy variable coded 1 for firms whose biggest shareholder is a SOE affiliated to a local government. DPRIVATE is a dummy variable coded 1 for firms whose biggest shareholder is a private investor. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in billions. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets at the end of the year. IORA is the total asset growth rate. DEVELOPI is a geo-economic dummy variable for China’s economically developed regions, including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and the coastal regions (ranked by each region’s GDP per capita over the 8 sampling years). The table reports pooled-OLS regression and fixed effects OLS regression. Standard errors are reported in brackets, where ***, ** and † represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The Relationship between Ownership Identity, Ownership Concentration, and Firm Performance: Evidence from China 22 Global Journal of Management and Business Research Volume XXII Issue VIII Version I Year 2022 ( ) A © 2022 Global Journals