Global Journal of Management and Business Research, A: Administration and Management, Volume 22 Issue 9

ethical emotivism, for many people, is that it simply does not describe what we do when we are making up our mind on moral issues. According to this objection, deciding what we ought to do in a particular situation is different from asking ourselves what we want to do, sorting out our attitudes or engaging in self- persuasion. 98 There are some very serious problems with the theory of ethical emotivism that has essentially impugned on its integrity, in the eyes of contemporary ethical theorists. One of the main problems with ethical emotivism is that it does not seem to be able to give an account of the difference between everyday disapprovals and moral disapprovals. 99 Surely moral judgements mean more to us than just an expression of emotion, and most ethicists suggests that moral judgements are (or absolutely have to be) more than just an expression of our emotion to a particular act . 100 1. Torture is wrong. Also, ethical emotivism is entrapped in the ‘Frege- Geach problem.’ This is a criticism that takes the form of a standard modus ponens argument: 2. If torture is wrong, then torturing your little brother is wrong. 3. Therefore, torturing your little brother is wrong . 101 Prima facie, this argument appears to be valid in the sense that the conclusion does follow the premise. However, for emotivism, the argument is ‘fallacious.’ The emotivist would say that this argument commits the fallacy of equivocation because the expression ‘torture is wrong’ has a different meaning in the second premise than it does in the first premise. It seems that the statement ‘torture is wrong’ is asserted and therefore is used to express the disapproval of torture. However in the second premise it follows something completely different altogether, it also seems that if one were to analyze the second premise, one would not state any attitude at all. Thus, each occurrence or torture has a different meaning, and the argument does commit the fallacy of equivocation. But it seems bizarre to draw such a conclusion Why is the argument fallacious? It seems that the fallacy can actually be ascribed to emotivism, because in premise 1 it seems to express an attitude, but in premise 2 it does not. In this regard, it must be pointed out that it cannot express such an attitude even in premise 1. In terms of recommendations, the ethical emotivist needs to replace the evaluative and non-evaluative dichotomywith the evaluative/mixed/empirical trichotomy. 102 Also, the problem of explaining apparent entailment relations involving sentences that do not express beliefs and cannot be either true or false, needs to be adequately addressed. 103 Of course, the emotivists’ performative fallacy (has to be addressed) regarding why it is impossible to give the meanings of evaluative words, by specifying the linguistic acts (commanding, recommending, praising, blaming) that utterances of simple evaluative sentences are standardly used to perform . 104 O ne appealing feature of ethical emotivism is that it may promote a tolerant and accepting attitude towards moral diversity. Hence, according to emotivism, as moral judgments are nothing more than 'pure expressions of feeling,' no one has the right to say their morality is true and another's is false. 105 However, an unappealing feature of ethical emotivism is that it arbitrarily reduces morality to emotions. But, morality cannot be reduced to emotions since our emotions and moral judgments may not always be in agreement with each other. 106 It is a common feature of moral debate that we do not evaluate a moral judgment by its emotional force, but by the reasons that can be given in its support. Homosexuality in humans has been the center of broad discussions and has been widely accepted by many societies in recent times, as a valid alternative to heterosexuality. There are different theories regarding the homosexual behaviour in humans. These theories incorporate chemical, social and personal reasons behind the same sex attractions. 107 There are two main theories as to what causes homosexual attractions. The first theory is that a homosexual orientation is essentially dictated by genetic and/or biological factors. Put simply, some people are “born gay.” The second theory is that homosexual attractions develop primarily as a result of psychological and environmental influences and early experiences. Unfortunately, in the public square, the latter theory has appeared to be in decline and the former gaining favor in recent decades. 108 79 Global Journal of Management and Business Research Volume XXII Issue IX Version I Year 2022 ( ) A © 2022 Global Journals The Ethical Emotivism of A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson: A Tendentious Explanatory Matrix for Human Homosexual Behaviour Beyond the Sentimentalist Turn,” Philosophical Psychology 33 (4): 569- 571. 98 Daniel Dohrn (2018) “Moral Sentimentalism in Counterfactual Contexts: Moral Properties Are Response-Enabled,” Philosophia 46 (1):69-71. 99 Nathan Robert Howard (2018) “Sentimentalism about Moral Understanding,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1065-1068. 100 Joshua May & Victor Kumar (2018) “Moral Reasoning and Emotion,” In Karen Jones, Mark Timmons & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology (Oxfordshire: Routledge) pp. 139-140. 101 Peter Geach, (1960) “Ascriptivism,” The philosophical Review 69: 2-3. 102 James Dreier (2009) “Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement,” Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):79-80. 103 Megan Fritts (2022) “Well-Being and Moral Constraints: A Modified Subjectivist Account,” Philosophia 50 (4):1809-1811. 104 Christopher Frugé (2022) “Artifactual Normativity,” Synthese 200 (2):17-19. 105 Seungbae Park (2022) “Moral Subjectivism versus Moral Objectivism,” Filosofija. Sociologija 3 (33):269–272. 106 Nicholas Drake (2020) “Love, Reasons, and Desire,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3):591-593. 107 Arash Abizadeh (2019) “Subjectivism, Instrumentalism, and Prudentialism about Reasons: On the Normativity of Instrumental Transmission,” European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):387-390. 108 Mark Schroeder (2014) “Does Expressivism Have Subjectivist Consequences?” Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):278-280.