Global Journal of Management and Business Research, A: Administration and Management, Volume 22 Issue 9

b) Homosexuality is immoral, whether inborn or acquired Regarding the assumption that since homosexuality may be natural or inborn (an unproven assertion) it is by that token, morally neutral or legitimate, one might ask? If it can be demonstrated conclusively that adultery, incest, paedophilia, violence, lying are inherited, would anyone be justified in considering them legitimate or neutral? Should the standard for morality be determined by what is inborn? 77 Contrary to this view, homosexuality is still immoral, whether inborn or acquired. An immoral behaviour cannot be legitimized by a quick baptism in the gene pool. 78 Morality is not determined by what is inborn. Those wishing to discover God's moral standards must look to the Bible; the Ten Commandments and God's pre-fall order, rather than the latest discoveries of science regarding the post-fall sinful condition, in order to discover the moral guidelines on whether homosexuality is moral and immoral. 79 From available indications, the leap from what is (alleged facts of the homosexual condition) to what ought to be (the morality of homosexuality) is too large to make . 80 c) Marriage serves the common good Marriage between one man and one woman is recognized as a public institution, with its attendant benefits and responsibilities, precisely because it serves the common good. Marriage offers the State its most necessary common good, 81 b y bringing children into the world and raising them in a family that includes the love of their mother and father. The State needs people (citizens) in order to flourish. No people, no State. Under the principle of subsidiarity, the common good is better served when mothers and fathers raise their children, not the State. 82 d) Homosexuality obfuscates the character and purpose of marriage Extending marriage to same-sex partners will redefine marriage in such a way that marriage will no longer be understood to have a direct relationship to the procreation and education of children, such that bringing children into the world and raising them, will be seen as extrinsic rather than intrinsic to marriage. 83 Openness to procreation will no longer belong to the very substance and definition of marriage. It will be reduced merely to an option for those couples who happen to want children. Some might argue that if there is an insistence that openness to procreation belongs to the very essence and definition of marriage, then it would also amount to excluding not only same-sex partners from marriage, but infertile heterosexual couples as well. 84 Upon careful examination, this objection is neither valid nor compelling. The sexual activity of an infertile heterosexual couple is intrinsically open to procreation, even though their sexual union cannot result in procreation. 85 The sexual act of an infertile couple is the kind of act that is open to procreation ; the fact that it cannot lead to procreation is accidental to the act itself. Under normal circumstances (of fecundity), their act would lead to procreation. On the other hand, the sexual act of a same-sex couple is the kind of act that is never open to procreation. The non- openness to procreation (regrettably so) constitutes the substance and definition of the homosexual act. 86 T hus, one can rationally hold that openness to life is intrinsic to marriage, without excluding infertile couples from marriage. Infertile heterosexual couples engage in the kind of act that leads to procreation, but homosexual couples do not. Hence, redefining marriage to include same-sex partners will consequently remove the essential public purpose of marriage from its definition: that is, the procreation and education of children, 87 thereby destroying the goal of marriage, as a social institution meant for the common good. The argument that the legalization of same-sex marriages will have no harmful impact on heterosexual marriage is, therefore, adjudged to be entirely false. 88 Such a redefinition of marriage will have the necessary effect of reducing all marriages to the status of private relationships with no relation to the common good. This, in turn, renders the public recognition of marriage as an institution utterly superfluous. To render a public institution superfluous is, of course, to undermine and call into question why the state should recognize and support that institution at all. 89 77 Global Journal of Management and Business Research Volume XXII Issue IX Version I Year 2022 ( ) A © 2022 Global Journals The Ethical Emotivism of A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson: A Tendentious Explanatory Matrix for Human Homosexual Behaviour 77 Harriet E. Baber (2004) “Is Homosexuality Sexuality?” Theology 107 (837):169-171. 78 Joseph A. Diorio (2001) “Sexuality, Difference, and the Ethics of Sex Education,” Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (3):277–279. 79 Lara Denis (1999) “Kant on the Wrongness of 'Unnatural' Sex,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 16 (2): 225-227. 80 Jim Cotter (1991) “Same-Sex Relationships,” Studies in Christian Ethics 4 (2):29-31. 81 Richard D. Mohr (1989) “Gay Studies as Moral Vision,” Educational Theory 39 (2):121-123. 82 Robert Charles Lyle (1975) “Deviant Sexual Behaviour: Modification and Assessment,” Journal of Medical Ethics 1 (4):197-198. 83 Ben Spiecker (1992) “Sexual Education and Morality,” Journal of Moral Education 21 (1):67-69. 84 Yoel Inbar, David A. Pizarro, Joshua Knobe & Paul Bloom (2009) “Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Intuitive Disapproval of Gays,” Emotion 9 (3): 435– 437. 85 Sharon Lamb (1997) “Sex Education as Moral Education: Teaching for Pleasure, About Fantasy, and Against Abuse,” Journal of Moral Education 26 (3):301-303. 86 Timothy F. Murphy (2013) “Getting Past Nature as a Guide to the Human Sex Ratio,” Bioethics 27 (4):224-226. 87 David McPherson (2017) “Traditional Morality and Sacred Values,” Analyse & Kritik 39 (1):41-43. 88 Petra Jonvallen (2010) “Sex Differentiation and Body Fat: Local Biologies and Gender Transgressions,” European Journal of Women’s Studies 17 (4):379-38. 89 Martina Löw (2006) “The Social Construction of Space and Gender,” European Journal of Women’s Studies 13 (2):119-121.