Global Journal of Management and Business Research, B: Economics and Commerce, Volume 21 Issue 5

A Practical Tariff Methodology for Port Authorities Sandro José Monteiro α & Fabiane Santos de Mello σ Abstract- This work describes a practical tariff model regarding public ports, using the new normative launched for the National Agency of Waterborne Transportation (ANTAQ) in Brazil. It also brings analytical elements of economic balance based on appropriate average costs in each tariff modality. Contains a complete mathematical-financial model, including a numerical, hypothetical and general example - a case study serving as a starting point for all other concrete cases. Keywords: port tariff, pricing, port, port authorities, economic regulation. I. I ntroduction n Brazil, the former “Port Modernization Law”, Law No. 8,630, of February 25, 1993, provided that private terminals could predominantly handle their own cargo, which was an inhibiting factor that significantly reduced the possibility of competition between public ports and private terminals. The current regulatory framework, Law No. 12,815, of June 5, 2013 (“New Law of Ports”), has expanded the possibilities of creating port infrastructure, freeing up the possibility of handling third-party cargo in Private Terminals (TUPs). Deregulation had the effect of a vertiginous growth in the number of TUPs, now in open competition with leases in public ports areas. Thereby, managers of public ports were forced to face a new market, leaving, to the past, the monopolistic position, in search of greater competitiveness and new revenues. The motto became efficiency, with the port tariff being a key factor for such success. Port structures directly influence national navigation, impacting the product price for end customers. Therefore, when we talk about modernization and competition, we are also talking about adequate and reasonable port tariffs, which encourage the greatest possible movement within public ports, sustaining quality infrastructure, as the order of the day is to reduce the “Brazil Cost”. Author α : Engineer and Master in Engineering at São Paulo University, Postgraduate in Management, PhD in Economic Law. e-mail: sandro_monteiro@hotmail.com Author σ : Civil Engineer, Federal agent and Specialist in Regulation at ANTAQ, Postgraduate in Ports and Maritime Law. e-mail: engfabiane1@gmail.com I Given this background, the National Agency of Waterborne Transportation - ANTAQ, in 2019, issued Normative Resolution No. 32 (RN 32/2019) (ANTAQ, 2019), esforces a standardized tariff structure to the port authorities and a list of procedures for projects of review and adjustment of prices. Those rules created several new concepts, including: Tariff Modality, Required Revenue, Market Segmentation, Reference Period and Tariff Group. Some highlights include article 15, which defines two procedural typologies: the tariff review, which may be extraordinary or ordinary, and the tariff readjustment. Article 16 informs elements of analysis, establishing a tariff review model based on the balance of projected revenues with the projected average costs of each service for the subsequent period. However, there is a lack of information: a mathematical-financial model and the nuances of this type of analysis. The purpose of this work was the development of an application model with a hypothetical and general case study, using ANTAQ´s rules contained in RN 32/2019, establishing the difference, in Brazil, between adjustment of tariffs and review of tariff, as well as analytical elements of economic-financial balance. The tariff modeling also seeks to elucidate a list of general principles for all those involved in the transportation services inside public ports, especially those provided by port authorities. II. D evelopment a) Price regulation in Brazilian public ports "Price regulation" is understood, in Brazil, to be a regular government activity whose tool is a set of methodologies that determines a maximum or minimum price used by public utilities, carriers and service providers to charge its consumers for each product or service provided. Since such economic agents most often hold monopoly power, where the efficient price does not arise from a normal interaction between demand and supply, thus it is up to an independent agency to arbitrate the price. Therefore, it is a good method of replacing the competitive market, simulating its results. Price formation is a central issue to regulation, as it concentrates questions about the operational cost distribution to consumers, including subsidies. Reconciling multiplayers interests are among the regulator's attributions. Such rules are debated by the scholar Joana Paula Batista (BATISTA, 2005), in her book “Public Services Remuneration”, discussing the applicable © 2021 Global Journals 11 Global Journal of Management and Business Research Volume XXI Issue V Version I Year 2021 ( ) B