Global Journal of Management and Business Research, B: Economics and Commerce, Volume 22 Issue 4

Legault (2009) observed that the creativity and innovativeness of highly skilled workers in Canadian business-to-business (B2B) technology services firms was a form of organizational commitment and a source of competitive advantage for these firms over firms in other industries. Christensen & Gordon (1999) demonstrated that the connection between culture and performance is contingent upon the type of industry. Bernhardt, Spiller & Theodore (2013) investigated minimum wage, overtime, and other workplace infringements in the labor market for low-wage employees. They observed the existence of significant disparity in both the combination and the pervasiveness of violations across industries. Weil (2007) noted that though government agencies would wish to see a reduction in the prevalence of infringements of workplace policies, constraints in available resources for investigation and the frequently-politicized environment surrounding regulatory decisions have resulted in agencies of government relying on worker complaints for enforcement of workplace policies. Additionally, Weil (2007) observed; that there exists a high degree of variation in complaint rate across industries and that fundamental compliance circumstances explicate a comparatively trivial percentage of total complaint activity. I would argue that such variations in compliance with workplace policies across industries can contribute to disparities in inter-industry value creation. Additional factors that can facilitate or enervate the power of employees in influencing the attractiveness of industries include employee stability and labor productivity. Organizational performance is positively related to employee stability (Kurdi & Alshurideh, 2020), and labor productivity (Edwards, 1958). Employee stability, in turn, varies by industry characteristics. Feinberg (1979) observed that even after controlling for worker differences, more concentrated industries provide less stability in employment (excluding women and workers with the most outstanding educational attainments). Weiss (1966) noted that this would probably not be problematic if workers are compensated for the added employment risk; however, Weiss (1966) found, after accounting for personal characteristics, that more concentrated industries did not pay higher wages. Edwards (1958) demonstrated that labor productivity varies considerably from industry to industry and from industry group to industry group. Researchers have observed the possibility for a consolidation or a weakening in the power of suppliers. Suppliers’ power can be debilitated by the embeddedness and brand recognition of firms in the successive stage in the supply chain. Kim (2017) demonstrates that customer concentration and interconnection unfavorably impact the supplier's ensuing year returns on assets. In contrast mutual dependence augments them and decreases the unfavorable effect of customer concentration on the profitability of suppliers. Amato & Amato (2009) observed that the profitability of small manufacturing firms is unfavorably impacted by substantial market share of shopping-goods retailers. On the contrary, in markets for convenience goods, the big market share of retailers has no impact on manufacturers’ return. They posited that strong private brands might offer bargaining power for convenience goods retailers when they negotiate with brand manufacturing firms that have a national presence. Suppliers’ power can as well be strengthened by bundling practices. Chambolle & Molina (2019) demonstrated that buyers’ bargaining power elucidates the advent of bundling practices by a multi-good producer in foreclosing more resourceful upstream rivals. c) The Threat of Entry The entry of new firms into an industry frequently brings about a reduction in the profitability of the industry. Porter (1980) posited that new entrants to an industry introduce new capacity, the yearning to capture market share, and frequently tremendous resources. They can exert downward pressure on prices or worsen cost positions, reducing industry profitability. However, there are other consequences of entry that can improve the fortunes of incumbent firms. McCann & Vroom(2010)examined the prospect that entry could also furnish opportunities for existing firms. On the basis of the theory of agglomeration, which delineates the advantages that could emanate from collocation of competitors, McCann & Vroom (2010) explicitly investigated the agglomeration and competitive impact of entry by applying unique data about Texas hotels and found that existing firms could set higher prices when confronting entrants whose agglomeration advantages are expected to overshadow their competitive consequences. Geroski (1989) posited that under some conditions and to a certain degree, entry and innovation can stimulate the economic productivity of incumbent firms. For entry to be made, potential new entrants have an expectation about attainable profits in the industry. Porter (1980) asserted that entry decisions frequently hover around the entry deterring price, which is defined the as the price, which after adjusting for the good’s quality and service, is just sufficient to cover the expected rewards from entry against the anticipated costs. Porter (1980) additionally posited that entry costs into an industry would be dependent on the probable reaction from existing competitors and significantly on barriers to entry into the industry. The entry deterring price can be a limit price in which the incumbent firm charges a price between the monopoly price and the long-run average cost (Bain, 1949). However, under certain conditions, the limit price can lie above the monopoly price. Harrington (1986) demonstrated that, in a monopoly market, if the potential new entrant is not The Determinants of the Attractiveness of an Industry: An Extension of The Porter’s Five-Forces Framework 85 Global Journal of Management and Business Research Volume XXII Issue IV Version I Year 2022 ( ) B © 2022 Global Journals