Global Journal of Management and Business Research, B: Economics and Commerce, Volume 23 Issue 3

Hybrid: presence of incentive instruments, as well as administrative control instruments and enables both autonomous and coordinated adaptation Source: Adapted from Williamson (1991) and Fiani (2011) Table 3 shows a greater understanding of Fiani (2011) regarding the governance structure advocated by Williamson (1991), so that the author expands by expressing that the types of governance can be, in relation to assets: specialized and non-specialized; in terms of asset specificity: location, physical attributes, dedicated assets and, finally, human assets. As for the general types of governance, both Hennart (2006) and Fiani (2011) are unanimous in recognizing the types: market, hierarchy and hybrids. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) are identified, where they understand that measurement problems are a function of production teams. Thus, some transactions are more recurrent than others, so that the problem of transaction costs falls on less frequent transactions, which are generally more complex (LOPES; ALMEIDA; FREITAG, 2021). We return to the thought initially developed by Coase (1937), when he highlights the challenge of measurement or measurement in which he seeks to explain the existence of firms. From this angle and as attributes are transacted about which there is not full information, transaction and measurement costs become an important component to be considered (CALEMAN et al., 2006). v. The Theory of Measurement Cost The challenge of measuring transaction costs is also highlighted by Zylbersztajn and Graça (2002), when they understand that the measurement of transaction costs represents a gap in TCT when they identify there is difficulty in effectively raising the costs of a transaction. Based on the Theory of Measurement Costs (TCM), a field of research that concerns the development of complementary theoretical models to TCT (WANG, 2003) is opened. Notwithstanding the difficulties, the measurement of transaction costs becomes relevant as it allows specific studies on the impact generated by institutional changes, in addition to the firm's gains from choosing the best strategic options (WANG, 2003). TCM represents an appendix to the larger theory called TCT and, in this understanding, Zylbersztajn and Graça (2002, p.22) state that the “Theory of Measurement Costs gives rise to a set of implications in traditional TCT concepts. In this circumstance, it is worth mentioning the emphasis expressed by Wang (2003), when he highlights the phrase by Lord Kelvin inscribed in the Social Sciences building at the University of Chicago: “When you cannot measure, your knowledge is scarce and unsatisfactory”. The understandings of Cunha, Saes and Mainville (2013) deserve attention when they say that, in theoretical terms, forms of governance are analyzed by the economics of transaction costs under two aspects: (i) the proposal by Williamson (1985), previously studied and that prioritizes the discussion of transaction attributes such as frequency, asset specificities and uncertainties and; (ii) Barzel's (2002) approach, which analyzes the difficulty of measuring the relevant attributes of transactions due to information asymmetry. Wang (2003) recognizes that the problem of measuring transaction costs, like any measurement problem in economics, is not simple. The main methods of measuring transaction costs presented in the studies by Wang (2003) are: (i) sum of the value of the resources needed to locate possible partners and to carry out transactions; (ii) difference between the price paid by the buyer and the price received by the seller; (iii) negotiation and transaction guarantee costs; and (iv) costs of government regulation. By proposing the methodological foundation of this work through an integrative review, the intention was to provide a synthesis of knowledge and incorporate it into the applicability of the result in the practice of the artisanal açaí beater, certainly externalizing the activity of the beater is necessary. b) The Activities of Artisanal Açaí Whisk Based on the understandings of Gala (2017, p.109), when he says that “certain societies remain poor because they have not developed a basis of rules, laws and customs capable of stimulating economically productive activities, with the accumulation of capital and knowledge. The fundamental concept for under- standing prosperity and economic development, in Douglas North's proposal, is that of efficient institutions”. In this sense, the work evolves when it seeks to externalize the activity of the artisanal açaí whisk. i. The Artisanal Açaí Whisk It is necessary to consider that the açaí produced in the Brazilian Amazon on dry land or in a floodable area is a natural and regional product whose production is not replicated with the same effectiveness in other lands of the planet (COSTA, 2012). In this scenario, scarcity arises and thus açaí holds a natural non-ubiquity, so açaíis attributed as a product that attributes a sophisticated productive fabric to the Amazon (GALA, 2017). The açaí whisk operates at a fixed point of production and sale. These micro-entrepreneurs who work in artisanal açaí points, and are small establishments located in the most diverse 20 Global Journal of Management and Business Research Volume XXIII Issue III Version I Year 2023 ( ) B © 2023 Global Journals Study of Artisanal Açaí Beater under the Light of Institutionalist Theory: An Integrative Review