Global Journal of Science Frontier Research, H: Environment & Earth Science, Volume 22 Issue 5

Schwartz (1996) highlights that through a scenario the world of facts is connected to the world of perceptions (as in a theater, in which spectators suspend disbelief relative to any point and react to the scenes – as if they were actually following the real world). A good scenario leads people to “voluntary suspension of some disbelief,” during the sufficient time to appreciate the impact of “new beliefs,” according to the author. As noted by Ramirez and Selin (2014), if the fundamental objectives of a scenario are to bring up implicit assumptions, test tacit knowledge, question prejudices of the impossible and the possible, and change views and minds – ambiguity and uncertainty would be productive. “If each scenario is as plausible as the next, every scenario is worthy of attention; and the defined scenario is not the only one – it is the comparisons between them that generate value” (RAMIREZ and SELIN, 2014). Van der Heijden (2005) highlights the importance of multiple futures (equally plausible), which serve the purpose of a test bed for policies and plans. By the plausibility method, scenario planning only assesses plausible futures using qualitative tools; they can be produced inductively or deductively – if it were possible to establish probability about a certain end, there would be no need to build scenarios (RAMIREZ and SELIN, 2014). “Scenarios emerged after the Second World War as a method of military planning. The US Air Force tried to imagine what its opponents might do and prepare alternative strategies” (SCHWARTZ, 1996). Indeed, conflict is a profoundly existential phenomenon, potentially destructive to lives and livelihoods, hence the numerous attempts by many researchers to make it more predictable (GAUB, 2020). Concerning the military, although war is a prerogative of the state, creative works imagine how war might evolve in the future and directly influence it (for example, by speculating on possible new problems – testing the limits of new technocentric approaches) (GAUB, 2020). On the possibility of nuclear conflict, Gaub (2020) points to the reasoning of experts at the “opposite end of the scale,” who hold firmly to the theory of deterrence – the idea that the possession of nuclear weapons, in itself, is enough to avoid war. Although it is a plausible conception, it can generate relative comfort (in limiting knowledge, ideas, and action to be taken about an imminent conflict of this nature) (GAUB, 2020). Focusing on the ways and means by which conflicts will be fought in the future, and “without the ambition to develop generalized theories or predict the beginning of a conflict before it happens” (GAUB, 2020), the author considers it relevant that societies and institutions are prepared for an imminent conflict, so that there are fewer surprises (GAUB, 2020). Imagination must be applied to this (GAUB, 2020). Using imagination is working with the anticipation of facts, mainly due to possible impacts that, by chance, are possible to occur. The author also notes that there may be degrees of imprecision, especially if future conflicts are contemplated as an extrapolation of current trends, or if they are entirely different from the past (disruptive illusion) (GAUB, 2020). In 1960, from the perspective of “conflict in a nuclear age” (thermonuclear wars), Kahn (2007) approached this problem for human civilization from the analysis of scenarios. Subsequently, Kahn et al . (1976) also used the same methodology to examine “other kinds of real problems” facing humanity (by presenting a partial report on crucial long-term issues of broad interest). About the scenarios developed by Kahn (2007) and Kahn et al . (1976), analyzes referring to environmental issues proved to be insipid (KAHN, 2007; KAHN et al . 1976). The perspective for humanity presented in Kahn et al . (1976) credited as “the most likely and representative” for a 200-year interstice opposes what the authors cited as “popular and generalized discussions [...] that indicate bleak prospects” (KAHN et al . 1976). That is, the scenario described by Kahn et al . (1976) is entirely diferent, in the sense of being more positive for humanity, and not “doomsday literature” (KAHN et al . 1976). A paradoxically intriguing observation concerns the credit given to the vision in Kahn et al . (1976) “as the most likely and representative” – since the perspective presented is “deliberately non-technical; suggestive and speculative; and may present errors and omissions” (KAHN et al . 1976). That is, about “popular and generalized discussions [...] that indicate bleak prospects” (KAHN et al . 1976), Kahn et al . (1976), similarly, heuristically, and superficially discuss the future – only from an entirily optimistic approach, based on the belief in public policies, by the impact (directly, indirectly, and in a lasting way) of the thoughts and ideas resulting from their “investigations.” Based on the quote: “what is well known is misunderstood, and what is taken for granted is taken without thinking” (KAHN et al . 1976) – by a crude and simplistic interpretation of this – the authors justify their suggestive reasoning, also disregarding the discussion and the opinion of intellectuals and academics. With some exceptions (for example, the problem of nuclear proliferation), Kahn et al . (1976) are in favor of “progress” (as exemplified by science, technology, and industrialization), considering that technological “progress” will help society to deal with facing absolutely “all” future problems (radiation, and chemical or toxic waste, also including) – “it seems quite 1 Global Journal of Science Frontier Research Volume XXII Issue V Year 2022 23 ( H ) Version I © 2022 Global Journals Autonomous Technology in Scenario by Rare Geophysical Processes (Underwater Focus)