Global Journal of Science Frontier Research, H: Environment & Earth Science, Volume 23 Issue 5

change in the Northern parts of Ghana. In other words, as climate change continues to pose threats to the agricultural activities of farmers which have rendered most of them jobless and others migrated to the urban south, the study discusses efforts by NSAs in ensuring the resultant farmers adapt and mitigate the threats by climate change. The paper is organized into five main sections. The first section is an introduction that provides background to the study as well as elicits the problem statement. The second section provides a brief literature review and theoretical framework which frames and puts the study in context. Section three of the study provides an overview of the methodology employed for the study whilst section four provides analysis and findings which have been presented in themes. The final section provides conclusions and policy implications. II. T heoretical O verview a) Climate Change and Food Security Risks A major challenge associated with climate change is food security risks. Among the key issues that are germane to the discussion of food security involve , inter alia : (1) Availability (the extent to which a community or section can make available or be given or achieve adequate food) (2) Access (the extent to which a people or community can obtain the food produced or available), (3) Utilization (the extent to which a people or community can make the most of food’s benefits), and (4) Stability (the extent to which a people or community can ensure availability and access to food consistently) (FAO 2006; Barrett 2010). Across Sub-Saharan Africa, the number and level of undernourished individuals have increased beginning of 2014 (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO 2017). Consistent with this pattern, food insecurity is predominant all over the Northern Areas of Ghana (Hjelm & Dasori 2012). Estimating levels of food insecurity is challenging, given contrasts in scale, the meaning of terms, and data collection protocols. Nonetheless, household-level information can give further understanding of whom within a nation is at the highest risk of food insecurity, and can assist with illuminating more vigorous policy (Hussein, 2002; Barrett, 2010). A household study undertaken by Quaye (2008) found subsistence farmers in the Northern part experienced food insecurity from four to six months out of the year, contingent on the crop. Farmers frequently depleted the millet supply in April, and could not replenish their stocks until September harvests. Other significant crops, including sorghum and maize, were lacking from June to October. As climate change advances and forces expanded desertification in the Sudanian savanna zone that traverses Northern Ghana, means subsistence farmers will probably encounter more prominent declines in yields of staple crops (Armah et al. 2011). Wossen and Berger (2015) found that climate change and the fluctuation of food costs were closely connected, bringing about higher food costs for poor families in Ghana. Be that as it may, subsistence farmers who are unable to produce surplus products cannot take part in the market, as they lack the funding and capital to do as such. In such cases, families that basically depend on subsistence farming become more defenseless against food insecurity. (Armah et al. 2011; Wossen & Berger 2015) b) Concept of Non-State Actors The concept of non-state actors involves an array of stakeholders or actors who do not hold the sovereign powers of nation-states yet remain crucial in climate governance architecture. This point has been corroborated by Allan (2020) who contends that the array of NSAs entails cities, multinational establishments, international organizations, and private individuals who assist in varied ways to respond to climate governance. On his part, Bevir (2009) brings the argument closer home by maintaining that the set of non-state actors responds to climate change by serving as promoters of particular policies, setting standards, and making a clarion call for efforts with or short of the cooperation of states (p.87). This suggests that non- state actors tend to operate as entities on their own or in concert with the state in driving home their activities. According to Hoffman (2011), NSAs mostly advocate and advance their case for actions and efforts towards climate adaptation and mitigation which may include, inter alia, energy efficiency, carbon markets, local adaptation, and revolution of the built environment as well as transportation systems (p. 5). They are a varied group, full of different motivations, capacities of action, and routes took – and have different types of presence at different levels of governance (Allan, 2020).There are different forms of NSAs in the context of climate change. These are actors who are not negotiating parties within the UNFCCC’ given some recognition (Duggan, 2019). Essentially, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) classifies NSAs into these distinct forms: business and industry non-governmental organizations (BINGOs) , environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs), indigenous peoples’ organizations (IPOs) , local government and municipal authorities (LGMAs) , research and independent non-governmental organizations (RINGOs) , trade unions non-governmental organizations (TUNGOs) , farmers and agricultural NGOs, women, and gender, and youth (YOUNGO) . 2 All these have observer status or serve as observer organizations. Bevir (2009) discusses key ways that non-state actors respond to climate change by serving or acting as promoters of particular policies or courses of action, © 2023 Global Journals 1 Year 2023 5 Global Journal of Science Frontier Research Volume XXIII Issue ersion I VV ( H ) Addressing Security Risk Caused by Climate Change Across Nations: The Role of Non-State Policy Actors